In this paper, we develop a classification-based method for the assessment of the trustworthiness of Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA). The QRA trustworthiness is assumed to be determined by the quality of the QRA process. Six quality criteria, i.e., completeness of documentations, understanding of problem settings, coverage of accident scenarios, appropriateness of analysis methods, quality of input data, accuracy of risk calculation, are identified as the factors most influencing the trustworthiness. The assessment is, then, formulated as a classification problem, solved by a Naive Bayes Classifier (NBC) constructed based on a set of training data, whose trustworthiness is given by experts. NBC learns the expert's assessment from the training data: therefore, once constructed, the NBC can be used to assess the trustworthiness of QRAs other than the training data. Leaveone-out cross validation is applied to validate the accuracy of the developed classifier. A stochastic hypothesis testing-based approach is also developed to check the consistency of the training data. The performance of the developed methods is tested for ten artificially generated scenarios. The results demonstrate that the developed framework is able to accurately mimic a variety of expert behaviors in assessing the trustworthiness of QRA.
of our knowledge, it is the first time that a classification-based framework is developed for the assessment of 1 QRA trustworthiness and that NBC is used for that purpose. It should be noted that in this paper, the classifier 2 is not directly used to assess the trustworthiness. Rather, it is used as a tool for constructing the evaluation 3 criteria used for determining the trustworthiness. 4 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. A general classification-based assessment framework of QRA 5 trustworthiness is developed in Section II. NBC is applied in Section III to assess the trustworthiness of QRA. 6 In Section IV, we develop a method to check the consistency of the experts that generate the training data. Ten 7 numerical case studies are considered and, then, an application is presented regarding a real trustworthiness 8 assessment of QRA in Section V. The paper is concluded in Section VI, with a discussion on potential 9 future developments. 10 
II. ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

11
In this section, we present a general framework to support classification-based trustworthiness assessment 12 of QRA. Let T represent the trustworthiness of QRA. We take a proactive perspective on trustworthiness 13 assessment and assume that T is determined by the quality of the QRA process. According to Rae et al. [13] , 14 a typical QRA process involves eight sub-processes, as shown in Figure 1 . To ensure the quality of a QRA 15 process, all the eight sub-processes should be conducted with high quality [13] . A framework for trustworthiness 16 assessment is, then, developed in Figure 2 by considering the quality requirements on the eight sub-processes 17 in Figure 1 . In Figure 2 , the trustworthiness of QRA is characterized in terms of six criteria, i.e., completeness of docu-19 mentations (x 1 ), understanding of problem settings (x 2 ), coverage of accident scenarios (x 3 ), appropriateness 20 of analysis methods (x 4 ), quality of input data (x 5 ), accuracy of risk calculation (x 6 ), which reflect the quality 21 requirements on the QRA process. Each criterion is evaluated into three grades, i.e., problematic (x i = 0), 22 acceptable (x i = 1) and satisfactory (x i = 2), i = 1, 2, · · · , 6, based on a set of predefined scaling rules 23 in Table A .1-A.6. Three discrete levels of T , i.e., T ∈ {0, 1, 2}, are considered in this paper. The levels are 24 distinguished in Table I based on their reliability, which concerns the repeatability of the risk analysis [26] and validity, which concerns whether the risk analysis addresses the "right problem" [26] . The problem of 1 trustworthiness assessment is, then, formulated as a classification problem: given the states of the six criteria 2 x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x 6 , determine an appropriate category for the trustworthiness T. It should be noted that both the 3 assessment framework in Figure 2 and the scaling rules in Table A .1-A.6 are constructed for illustrative purposes. 4 They are defied in a general form that allows them to be adapted for capturing the problem-specific features 5 in practical applications. • No further judgements can be made on the trustworthiness of the QRA.
• Such QRA should not be used to support any decision making. T = 1: Reliable but invalid • The result of QRA is repeatable but
• some critical hazards are not identified and analyzed by the QRA or
• some important risks (and their uncertainties) are not accurately quantified by the QRA.
• Such QRA can be used to support decision making, but not for safety-critical decisions.
T = 2: Reliable and valid
• The result of the QRA is repeatable and
• all critical hazards are identified and analyzed by the QRA;
• all important risks (and their uncertainties) are accurately quantified by the QRA.
• Such QRA can be used to support critical decision making.
III. TRUSTWORTHINESS ASSESSMENT BASED ON NAIVE BAYES CLASSIFIER
7
In this section, we first review some preliminaries on NBC-based classification in Subsection III-A and, then, 8 develop a NBC-based method to assess the trustworthiness of QRA in Subsection III-B.
A. Naive Bayes classifier 1 Let us define x = [x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x n ] ∈ X to be the input feature vector of the classification problem, where 2 X is the feature space. A NBC is a function f NBC that maps input feature vectors x ∈ X to output class 3 labels T ∈ {0, 1, · · · , C} [39]. Usually, the feature vector also takes discrete values, so that we have x i ∈ 4 {0, 1, · · · , n i }, i = 1, 2, · · · , n. Given a feature vector x, a NBC classifies it into the class with the maximum 5 posterior probability [39]:
The posterior probability in (1) is calculated using Bayes rule [39]:
.
(2)
If we further assume that the elements x i , i = 1, 2, · · · , n of the input feature vector x are independent, the 8 nominator of (2) becomes:
Note that the denominator in (2) is the same for all possible values of T . Therefore, (1) can be simplified:
In order to apply the NBC, the P r(T ) and P r(x i |T ) in (4) should be estimated from training data. Training
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data are a set of samples whose correct classes are already known. Suppose we have N training training data, 12 denoted by (x (q) , T (q) ), q = 1, 2, · · · , N training . Then, the required probabilities are estimated by:
where 1(·) is the indicator function and i = 1, 2, · · · , n, j = 0, 1, · · · , n i , k = 0, 1, · · · , C.
15
There is one potential problem for (5) and (6). Suppose that due to statistical variations, for some specific 16 values of j and k, we have 
where γ ∈ (0, 1] is an adjustment factor introduced to compensate for the possible zero probabilities; C + 1 22 and n i + 1 are the number of possible values for T and x i , respectively. In this section, we apply the NBC to develop a classifier for the trustworthiness assessment problem in Figure   2 2. In this case, we have six features, i.e., x = [x 1 , x 2 , · · · , x 6 ] T . Each feature has three discrete levels, i.e., 3 x i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, i = 1, 2, · · · , 6. Hence, X = {0, 1, 2} × · · · × {0, 1, 2} = {0, 1, 2} 6 . The trustworthiness also 4 takes three values, i.e., T ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In general, three steps are involved in the development of the classifier, 5 as shown in Figure 3 . Table I . The training data are, then, used to construct the NBC and once constructed, the NBC 10 is exploited to replace the expert for the assessment of trustworthiness.
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Since the NBC learns the expert's evaluation rationale from the training data, it is essential that the training the methods discussed previously. The training data (x (q) , T (q) ), q = 1, 2, · · · , N training are, then, collected by 27 expert judgements following the scaling rules in Table A .1-A.6. In the training phase, the NBC is constructed 28 by estimating P r(T ) and P r(x i |T ) from the training data, using (7) and (8), respectively. In the evaluation 29 phase, the constructed NBC is applied to replace the role of the experts and determine the trustworthiness of 30 a new QRA. By reviewing the related documents, the value for the feature vector x of the QRA is determined 31 first, based on the scaling rules defined in Table A .1-A.6. Its trustworthiness is, then, determined based on the 32 constructed NBC using (4). of the NBC is always small, which might impair the accuracy of the classifier. If the NBC is not accurate 2 enough, it might not be able to correctly "mimic" the expert's behavior in assessing the trustworthiness. It is, 3 then, necessary for us to consider the validation of the developed NBC, i.e., to determine our confidence that the 4 classifier can correctly represent the experts' judgement behaviors. As [37] , such confidence is measured by the 5 probability that the classifier correctly determines the trustworthiness of a QRA, denoted by CR. Leave-One- procedures of implementing LOOCV is summarized in Figure 5 , where (x (q) , T (q) ), q = 1, 2, · · · , N training 9 are training data and CR CV is the correctness rate estimated by LOOCV. The initial values for i and sum are 10 i = 0, sum = 0, respectively.
IV. CHECKING THE CONSISTENCY OF TRAINING DATA
12
Since the training data are empirically assessed by the experts, the consistency of the expert, therefore, is 13 essential in the NBC-based trustworthiness assessment. Training data generated by an inconsistent expert might 14 be self-contradicting and therefore misleading. In this section, we develop a statistical hypothesis testing to 15 check the consistency of the training data. any feature vector x in the training data set, an inconsistent expert would judge it to be T = i, i = 0, 2, · · · , C 20 with probability 1/(C + 1). Hence, we develop the following hypothesis testing to check the consistency of 
In (9), H 0 and H 1 are the null hypothesis and alternate hypothesis, respectively. If the observed data can support 2 us to reject the null hypothesis, the training data is believed to be consistent and can be used to train the NBC; 3 otherwise, we cannot trust the consistency of the training data and a reevaluation of the training data is required.
4
The CR CV estimated by LOOCV is chosen as the test statistic: used: α = 0.01 and α = 0.05.
Algorithm 1 below presents a pseudo-code for the developed consistency-checking method. In Algorithm 1, 1 n random is the sample size used to approximate the distribution of the test statistic. In principle, we prefer a 2 large value of n random since it helps to reduce the uncertainties in the decision caused by the approximation 3 errors in estimating p 1−α . However, balance is needed between the accuracy of the estimation and the required 4 computational costs. If Algorithm 1 returns IsConsist = 1, we conclude that the training data under evaluation 5 is consistent under the significance level α; otherwise, we cannot reach the conclusion that the training data 6 are consistent and a re-evaluation of the training data is required. Ten scenarios are artificially generated to test the performance of the developed algorithms. For each scenario, 6 we assume that the behavior of the experts when assessing the trustworthiness is consistent and known to us.
7
Ten different expert behaviors are used to generate the testing scenarios. We present one of the assumed expert 8 behaviors in Figure 6 for illustration purposes.
9 Let x
(i) f ull represent all the possible states in the feature space X, where in this case, we have i = 1, 2, · · · , 729.
10
The true trustworthiness for each x 
The influence of the size of the training data set on the performance of trustworthiness assessment is also Although the classification accuracies are affected by uncertainties arising from the difference in the expert 9 judgement behaviors adopted in different testing scenarios, the developed NBC can, in general, achieve satis-10 factory accuracies even for small values of N training . As demonstrated in Figure 7 : the average CR test exceeds 11 0.9 for N training greater than 18. However, when N training = 9, the classification accuracy is relatively poor.
12 This is because when N training = 9, the training data set is too small for accurate estimation of the posterior 13 probabilities using (7) and (8). To avoid such a problem, it is suggested to ensure that N training ≥ 18 in 14 practical applications. training data collection scheme. The resulting x (q) , q = 1, 2, · · · , N training are listed in Table II . It can be 7 verified that the training data collection scheme in Table II is an orthogonal design. The values of x (q) , q = 8 1, 2, · · · , N training correspond to the levels of the quality criteria in Table A .1-A.6. 9 2) Training data collection: Each row in Table II represents a pseudo QRA, characterized by specific quality 10 criteria. An expert is asked to assess the trustworthiness for these pseudo QRAs, for generating the training 11 data. Take the first row in Table II as an example. To generate the training data, the expert is asked the following 12 question: if the quality of a QRA process is as depicted in Table III , which level of trustworthiness in Table   13 I do you think the QRA has? Table III is generated by relating the values of x (q) , q = 1, 2, · · · , N training to 14 the corresponding quality criteria in Table A .1-A.6. The procedures are repeated for the other rows in Table II .
15
The training data generated by the expert are also listed in Table II . in Figure 4 . The estimated P r (T = k) and P r (x i = j | T = k) are presented in Table IV and Figure 11 , 2 respectively. The accuracy of the constructed classifier is evaluated by the correct classification rate and we 3 have CR = 0.944. Therefore, the constructed NBC can be used to represent the expert judgements and provide 4 reasonable assessment of the trustworthiness of QRA. 5 The constructed NBC can also help to explain the expert's behavior in assessing the trustworthiness. For 6 example, from Figure 11 , we notice that P r (x 1 = 0 | T = 0) = 0.6882, P r (x 1 = 0 | T = 1) = 0.0041, 7 P r (x 1 = 2 | T = 0) = 0.0233. From Bayes theorem, Completeness of documentation Some the following elements are missing in the documentations:
• scopes and objectives of the QRA;
• descriptions of the system under investigation and related references;
• accounts of the adopted analysis methods;
• presentation of source data needed for the analysis;
• report of the analysis results.
Understanding of problem settings The analysts are unaware of the problem settings of the QRA due to the presence of all the following flaws:
• the purposes of the QRA are not clearly understood;
• the systems of interests are not well defined;
• the resources constraints (e.g., time, computational resources, etc) are not clearly defined.
Coverage of accident scenarios Some critical accident scenarios are highly likely to be missed by the identification process:
• the coverage of the identified accident scenarios is not validated;
• the validation shows that some critical accident scenarios might be missing.
Appropriateness of analysis methods
• The features of the selected analysis method satisfy the requirements of the problem and
• successful applications in similar problems can justify the choice of the method.
Quality of input data
• There is no sufficient statistical data and the input data is purely based on expert judgements;
• epistemic uncertainty in the expert-generated input data is not considered.
Accuracy of risk calculation
• Only errors from the calculation process itself (e.g., the accuracy of Monte Carlo simulations) might exist and 
That is, if x 1 equals to zero, the expert tends to judge the QRA as unreliable. This is a natural result, since x 1 1 denotes the completeness of documentations. If the QRA process is not well-documented, it is unlikely to be 2 repeatable: therefore, the associated QRA is unreliable according to the criteria in Table I . or not is made by comparing the number of the conformed quality criteria to a predefined threshold value n th .
1
In this paper, we assume that a quality criterion i is conformed when x i = 2. Table V shows a comparison 2 between the classification-based framework and the conformance/non-conformance-based framework, using the 3 training data in Table II . It can be seen that in general, the existing conformance/non-conformance-based 4 framework cannot accurately model the complex expert knowledge expressed in the empirical data in Table II . 5 The developed method, on the other hand, is capable of capturing the complex behavior of expert judgement 6 in assessing the trustworthiness of the QRA. QRA report contains sufficient information on the scope and objective of the analysis, the system under 
Methods
Correct classification rate
Classification-based method CR = 0.944
Conformance-based method CR = 0.130, for n th = 0 CR = 0.315, for n th = 1 CR = 0.463, for n th = 2 CR = 0.556, for n th = 3 CR = 0.500, for n th = 4 CR = 0.500, for n th = 5 CR = 0.482, for n th = 6 investigation and the adopted analysis methods. However, according to the analyst understood well the purposes of the QRA, the system under investigation and the resources 5 constraints of the analysis. Therefore, we have x 2 = 2. verify the accident scenarios. Therefore, we have x 3 = 1.
11
• The scaling rule for appropriateness of analysis method (x 4 ) is listed in on ETA, which is an analytical method. Therefore, its accuracy can be ensured and we have x 6 = 2.
22
By running the NBC with the input feature vector x = [1, 2, 1, 0, 0, 2], we can calculate the posterior 23 probabilities from (4), as shown in Figure 12 . We can conclude that T = 1 for the QRA of the methanol 24 plant, which means, according to Levels Descriptions
Some the following elements are missing in the documentations:
At least one of the following flaws present in the documentations:
• descriptions of scopes and objectives are incomplete or ambiguous;
• descriptions of the system under investigation are unclear;
• no sufficient references on the system under investigation are given;
• descriptions of the adopted methods are unclear;
• presentations of the results are incomplete (e.g., no uncertainty is considered) or ambiguous.
The documentation of the QRA process contains sufficient information for its repetition:
• the documentation contains all the necessary parts;
• no flows in level x 1 = 1 present. Levels Descriptions
The analysts are unaware of the problem settings of the QRA due to the presence of all the following flaws:
x 2 = 1 The analysts misunderstand part of the problem settings due to some of the following flaws:
• the analysts fail to clearly understand the purposes of the QRA;
• the analysts fail to clearly understand the systems of interests;
• the analysts fail to clearly understand the resources constraints.
x 2 = 2
The analysts clearly understand the problem settings: no flaws in levels x 2 = 0 and x 2 = 1 occur. 
Levels Descriptions
x 3 = 0 Some critical accident scenarios are highly likely to be missed by the identification process:
x 3 = 1 • Validation reveals that most critical accident scenarios are covered by the identification process but
• the validation is conducted based on peer review rather than using real data.
x 3 = 2 • Validation reveals that most critical accident scenarios are covered by the identification process and
• the validation is reliable by using field data. Levels Descriptions
x 4 = 0 The features of the selected analysis method cannot satisfy the requirements of the problem:
• the methods cannot capture some features of the problem (e.g., time-dynamics, dependencies, etc.) or
• the methods require more resources (e.g., data, computational power, etc.) than that can be provided.
x 4 = 1 • The features of the selected analysis method satisfy the requirements of the problem but
• the conclusion is drawn based on expert experience.
x 4 = 2 • The features of the selected analysis method satisfy the requirements of the problem and
• successful applications in similar problems can justify the choice of the method. Levels Descriptions
x 5 = 0 • There is no sufficient statistical data and the input data is purely based on expert judgements;
x 5 = 1 • There is no sufficient statistical data;
• the input data are based on expert judgements with fully consideration of epistemic uncertainty.
x 5 = 2 • Sufficient statistical data can be used for risk analysis. Levels Descriptions
x 6 = 0 • The process of risk calculation contains major flaws;
• large errors might exist in the calculated risks.
x 6 = 1 • The process of risk calculation does not contain major flaws;
• only errors from the calculation process itself (e.g., the accuracy of Monte Carlo simulations) might exist but
• the uncertainties caused by the errors are not modeled.
x 6 = 2 • Only errors from the calculation process itself (e.g., the accuracy of Monte Carlo simulations) might exist and
• the uncertainties caused by the errors are properly modeled.
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